Азиатские тигры (igor_tiger) wrote,
Азиатские тигры

КНДР-Иран и инженер Хан

The Washington Times: КНДР на пути к следующему ядерному испытанию
Обама мало исведомлён об ядерных угрозах в Пхеньяне и Тегеране

Статья Джона Болтона, экс-посла США в ООН, являющегося одним из посредников в переговорах по корейской проблематике.


You wouldn’t know
it from the Obama
administration, but North Korea’s global threat
continues to metastasize. South
recently concluded that extensive
cyber-attacks against civilian and military targets in the South emanated from
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Following China’s lead in
information warfare, the North is creating yet another asymmetric military
capability it can deploy against its adversaries and also peddle for hard
currency to other rogue states and terrorists.

Although Pyongyang limited its targeting of this particular sortie
to South Korea, the
potential cyberwarfare battlefield is global and includes the United States, which already is the subject of
extensive cyberprobing, exploitation and espionage by China. For a
country perennially on the brink of starvation, North Korea’s military foray into
cyberspace demonstrates its continuing malevolence.

The DPRK’s
nuclear-weapons program has not rested on its laurels, either, with widely
observed surface-level preparations for a possible third underground test well
under way.

The North’s
development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear payloads is
also advancing apace, as Russian missile designer Yuri Solomonov highlighted
last month in a Kommersant interview. This is hardly surprisingly given Iran’s
increasing long-range capabilities, the extensive Tehran-Pyongyang
collaboration, and their programs’ common base in Soviet-era Scud missile

Meanwhile, Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan has released documents
purportedly showing prior North Korean bribery of senior
Islamabad officials to grease the transfer of
nuclear or ballistic-missile technology
. While their authenticity is disputed,
the documents are part of Mr. Khan’s continuing campaign to prove he did not
act solo in the world’s illicit nuclear-weapons bazaar.

He long ago
admitted supplying North Korea
and Iran
with critical nuclear technology. Pyongyang’s
unveiling in November of impressive new uranium-enrichment facilities at
and recent construction there show the continuing fruits of Mr. Khan’s
entrepreneurship. His documents - and the many others he undoubtedly has in a
shoebox somewhere - are worth verifying and actually might help Islamabad and Washington
work together to repair their fractured relationship and prevent China from
exploiting their current differences.

Clearly, North
Korea’s weapons programs are not decelerating even amid intensive preparations
for a possible transition of power, following Kim Jong-il’s death, to a third
member of the communist Kim dynasty. But faced with these challenges, the Obama
administration has been not only publicly silent but essentially passive both
diplomatically and intellectually. Only the Pentagon and the intelligence
community, fortunately still implementing the Proliferation Security
Initiative, have done much beyond noting pro forma that the troublemaking DPRK
is still at it.

Public silence is
not necessarily inappropriate, although the failure to comment on a wide range
of global threats posed by U.S.
adversaries is par for the course under President Obama. Based on presidential
attention levels, one would think Iran’s
nuclear-weapons program was withering away, Russia’s
active military penetration of the Arctic was of merely scientific interest,
and China’s aggressive
territorial claims in East Asia were mere
legal technicalities to be resolved by low-level functionaries.

Far more dangerous
than mere silence, of course, is the manifest absence of a behind-the-scenes
determination to stop the North’s nuclear-weapons and missile programs (not to
mention the other threats detailed above and many more). Mr. Obama’s deliberate
silence and near-palpable lack of interest have helped drive North Korea
into media obscurity while simultaneously symbolizing our failure to contain -
let alone eliminate - the DPRK’s threat.

Through the
“strategic patience” policy, the president has at least not been scurrying to
revive the failed Six-Party Talks or willfully denying the North’s
weapons-related progress, as many did in the George W. Bush administration’s
final years. But however politically self-satisfying “not Bush” might be,
strategic patience is a thoroughly inadequate response to North Korea and
has been from its inception.

A real strategy,
which we need much sooner than later, would require understanding that the DPRK
and Iranian threats, including cyberwarfare, are two sides of the same coin, not
unrelated outbreaks of nuclear contagion. The United States must take both
seriously, reversing our present course of ignoring both.

Waiting passively
for a third DPRK nuclear test is unacceptable
, although that might be the only
event to motivate Mr. Obama to pay at least lip service to combating Pyongyang’s continuing
threat. By removing the public spotlight from the North - and its customers and
suppliers - his administration has made it easier to evade existing sanctions
and harder to impose new constraints absent another attention-riveting
underground test. Moreover, Seoul is keenly aware of the North’s impending succession crisis and is likely
prepared to take a much tougher line than in recent years.

At a minimum,
therefore, we must press China
and Russia far harder to
quarantine North Korea’s
trafficking in nuclear and missile technologies and materials. Unfortunately,
the administration’s startling passivity means missing opportunities, which we
will all regret very soon.
Tags: Корея

  • Post a new comment


    Comments allowed for friends only

    Anonymous comments are disabled in this journal

    default userpic

    Your reply will be screened

    Your IP address will be recorded