Обама мало исведомлён об ядерных угрозах в Пхеньяне и Тегеране
Статья Джона Болтона, экс-посла США в ООН, являющегося одним из посредников в переговорах по корейской проблематике.
it from the Obama administration, but
continues to metastasize.
cyber-attacks against civilian and military targets in the South emanated from
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Following
information warfare, the North is creating yet another asymmetric military
capability it can deploy against its adversaries and also peddle for hard
currency to other rogue states and terrorists.
potential cyberwarfare battlefield is global and includes the
extensive cyberprobing, exploitation and espionage by
country perennially on the brink of starvation,
cyberspace demonstrates its continuing malevolence.
nuclear-weapons program has not rested on its laurels, either, with widely
observed surface-level preparations for a possible third underground test well
development of ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear payloads is
also advancing apace, as Russian missile designer Yuri Solomonov highlighted
last month in a Kommersant interview. This is hardly surprisingly given
increasing long-range capabilities, the extensive Tehran-Pyongyang
collaboration, and their programs’ common base in Soviet-era Scud missile
purportedly showing prior North Korean bribery of senior
nuclear or ballistic-missile technology. While their authenticity is disputed,
the documents are part of Mr. Khan’s continuing campaign to prove he did not
act solo in the world’s illicit nuclear-weapons bazaar.
He long ago
with critical nuclear technology.
unveiling in November of impressive new uranium-enrichment facilities at
Yongbyon and recent construction there show the continuing fruits of Mr. Khan’s
entrepreneurship. His documents - and the many others he undoubtedly has in a
shoebox somewhere - are worth verifying and actually might help
work together to repair their fractured relationship and prevent
exploiting their current differences.
Korea’s weapons programs are not decelerating even amid intensive preparations
for a possible transition of power, following Kim Jong-il’s death, to a third
member of the communist Kim dynasty. But faced with these challenges, the Obama
administration has been not only publicly silent but essentially passive both
diplomatically and intellectually. Only the Pentagon and the intelligence
community, fortunately still implementing the Proliferation Security
Initiative, have done much beyond noting pro forma that the troublemaking DPRK
is still at it.
Public silence is
not necessarily inappropriate, although the failure to comment on a wide range
of global threats posed by
adversaries is par for the course under President Obama. Based on presidential
attention levels, one would think
nuclear-weapons program was withering away,
active military penetration of the Arctic was of merely scientific interest,
territorial claims in
legal technicalities to be resolved by low-level functionaries.
Far more dangerous
than mere silence, of course, is the manifest absence of a behind-the-scenes
determination to stop the North’s nuclear-weapons and missile programs (not to
mention the other threats detailed above and many more). Mr. Obama’s deliberate
silence and near-palpable lack of interest have helped drive
into media obscurity while simultaneously symbolizing our failure to contain -
let alone eliminate - the DPRK’s threat.
“strategic patience” policy, the president has at least not been scurrying to
revive the failed Six-Party Talks or willfully denying the North’s
weapons-related progress, as many did in the George W. Bush administration’s
final years. But however politically self-satisfying “not Bush” might be,
strategic patience is a thoroughly inadequate response to
has been from its inception.
A real strategy,
which we need much sooner than later, would require understanding that the DPRK
and Iranian threats, including cyberwarfare, are two sides of the same coin, not
unrelated outbreaks of nuclear contagion. The
seriously, reversing our present course of ignoring both.
for a third DPRK nuclear test is unacceptable, although that might be the only
event to motivate Mr. Obama to pay at least lip service to combating
threat. By removing the public spotlight from the North - and its customers and
suppliers - his administration has made it easier to evade existing sanctions
and harder to impose new constraints absent another attention-riveting
underground test. Moreover,
prepared to take a much tougher line than in recent years.
At a minimum,
therefore, we must press
trafficking in nuclear and missile technologies and materials. Unfortunately,
the administration’s startling passivity means missing opportunities, which we
will all regret very soon.