С одной стороны, действительно, с 2004 года "ШОСтёрка" словно остановилась в своём развитии: не было принято ни одного нового члена. И более того, принятие новых членов не предвидится даже в обозримом будущем. В том числе, и в отношении Монголии, у которой на сей счёт наибольшие шансы.
Но, с другой стороны, развитие ШОС от саммита к саммиту все равно наблюдалось. Каждый раз, от саммита к саммиту, организация обрастала новыми участниками разных статусов. Так, в 2010 году ШОС расширилась за счёт партнёров Беларуси и Шри-Ланки, перешедших на новую ступень с прежнего статуса наблюдателей. А в нынешнем году расширение коснулось за счёт Афганистана, который стал наблюдателем при организации.
Так что, развитие ШОС и её постепенное расширение, укрепление всё-таки происходят. Да, конечно, не в тех аппетитных темпах, как НАТО, проглатывавшее за раз по 3-4 новых полноценных члена с кучей кандидатов, партнёров и т.д. Но где же сейчас НАТО, которое ждёт раскол на 2-центричную структуру?
В то время, как ШОС продолжает своё развитие.
Кстати, критерии членства в ШОС более чётко прописаны и конкретны. И их не сравнить с вождением за нос размытыми политическими критериями в НАТО
Сейчас в западной прессе уже проскальзывают нотки о "кризисе" ШОС. Хотя в этих "нотках" больше разочарования от неудавшейся попытки разбавить влияние Китая расширением за счёт новых "азиатских тигров". В частности, за счёт усиления в организации исламского элемента.
Ещё одна провокация - неудавшаяся попытка создать из ШОС некое "анти-НАТО" и таким образом втянуть Китай за счёт круговой поруки в противостояние с Западом. Организация по-прежнему последовательна в своих целях и торгово-экономическом статусе.
По сути же, наблюдается банальный двойной стандарт со стороны Запада.
Значит, с одной стороны, когда США усиленно продвигают Индию в ШОС, то перспективу в организации видят. Но, с другой стороны, как только попытка провалилась - перспектива сразу же куда-то исчезла.
Однако, в действительности, как видим, ШОС довольно успешно функционирует без Индии и даже не думает куда-то впадать в кризис.
Так что, пусть на Западе не переживают: ШОС будет продолжать расти. И "анти-НАТО" из неё не получится.
Кстати, если уж на то пошло: в ШОС - по мере развития организации - возникают всё больше и больше текущих проблем. Но среди них никогда не возникало вопроса о "проблеме" расширения: её просто нет.
Участники прекрасно работают в нынешнем формате и не испытывают потребности в новых членах.
The Diplomat: Почему "анти-НАТО" не будет расти
Tenth
anniversaries are usually marked by an important event or development, so it’s
not surprising that analysts were waiting eagerly to see what the 10th annual
summit of the heads of state of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
would produce. They needn’t have held their breath – as with so many previous
SCO meetings, attendees at the June 15 summit in Astana did little more than
issue vacuous declarations.
Like
previous SCO communiqués, the one issued in Astana called for a multipolar
world order (i.e. one not dominated by the United States) in which the United
Nations (not NATO) made all important international security decisions. And, in
contrast to Western government statements describing Western-style political
and civil liberties as universal values, the Astana Declaration called on all
governments to respect the sovereignty and independence of countries.
This time,
the Astana Declaration also contained some specific criticisms of various
Western policies. For example, it called for an end to the NATO military
operation in
One thing
that has always been a little surprising is the lack of progress the SCO has
made in developing its collective economic potential and promoting
multinational economic cooperation among its members. By world standards, none
of the SCO economic mechanisms could be considered ‘serious’ instruments, and
so far at least, SCO members have allocated limited resources to them, further
constraining their potential. Instead, SCO governments have preferred to offer
financial and development assistance on a bilateral basis, which gives them
greater influence.
More
broadly, though, the SCO remains stuck in a dilemma over expansion. For the
sixth year in a row, the SCO hasn’t admitted new full members or formal
observers. The current roster of full SCO members includes only those six states
that joined the organization at its founding in 2001:
Why? The
SCO governments argue that they need more time to establish the rules and
procedures needed to govern new members. In reality, the existing SCO members
have proved unable to overcome their differences over which countries should
receive membership or observer status. The SCO’s consensus rule gives any
member the right to veto decisions (although
One of the
problems with expansion is that it would further deepen the mutual tensions and
rivalries that already prevail among member governments. For example,
Indeed,
it’s these rivalries that also explain why SCO members don’t seem to care that
it never does anything important, even at last week’s 10th anniversary summit.
Through its activities, and indeed its mere existence, the SCO provides mutual
security assurance to its members, especially
SCO
documents and statements repeatedly affirm their commitment to avoid taking
actions that harm other members’ security, and members pledge not to join
alliances or otherwise take actions that would ‘allow their territories to be
used to undermine the sovereignty, security or territorial integrity of the
other member states.’
But perhaps
the most revealing SCO document, at least in terms of the organization’s
security priorities, is the ‘Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism,
Separatism, and Extremism,’ signed at the organization’s founding summit in
June
SCO members
subsequently decided to institutionalize their counterterrorist cooperation by
creating a Regional Antiterrorism Structure (RATS) in
The SCO
isn’t wholly a talking shop – in addition to issuing joint declarations, SCO
governments engage in a number of collective security activities, including
holding regular meetings among the defence ministers, armed forces chiefs,
general staffs, and border commanders of the SCO governments. Military experts
from SCO countries also engage in regular direct discussions related to their
functional expertise such as communications, engineering, and mapping.
The
security activities that tend to grab headlines, though, are the joint military
exercises. Since 2003, the SCO has organized a number of ‘anti-terrorist’
exercises that have involved their armed forces and paramilitary units as well
as intelligence and law enforcement personnel. These drills serve multiple
purposes, including reassuring the organization’s Central Asian members about
their security by demonstrating the intent and capacity of
In
addition, the exercises help the SCO militaries learn more about each other’s
evolving capabilities. This contribution may be especially important for
Who has
benefitted the most from the SCO? This could arguably be
The Central
Asian governments for their part also prefer dealing with both
Ultimately,
though, this state of benign mutual assurance within the SCO persists primarily
because
Of course,
Until then,
though, the SCO is a creature of its members, lacking independent authority or
resources. And if
http://the-diplomat.com/2011/06/23/why-the-‘anti-nato’-won’t-grow/