Пятёрка американских госсекретарей - Киссинджер, Шульц, Бейкер, Иглбергер и Пауэлл - написали статью в The Washington Post.
Авторитетные "республиканцы" сказали свой окончательный вердикт: ратификации СНВ-2 быть.
Obviously, the United
States does not sign arms control agreements
just to make friends. Any treaty must be considered on its merits. But we have
here an agreement that is clearly in our national interest, and we should
consider the ramifications of not ratifying it.
Although the US needs a strong and reliable nuclear force, the chief nuclear danger today comes not from Russia but from rogue states such as Iran and N-Korea and the potential for nuclear material to fall into the hands of terrorists.
Мэтью Ромни, тем временем, в гордом одиночестве продолжает бороться со СТАРТом:
Those who oppose New START are troubled by the answers to the following
■Does New START limit America’s
options for missile defense? Yes. For the first time, we would agree to an
interrelationship between strategic offensive weapons and missile defense.
already asserts that the document would constitute a binding limit on our
missile defense program. But the WikiLeaks revelation last weekend that North Korea has supplied Iran with
long-range Russian missiles confirms that robust missile defense is urgent and
■Is the treaty’s compliance verification program inadequate? Yes. In a
break from prior treaties, we would no longer be allowed to witness the
destruction of Russian mobile ICBMs and launchers. Further, the prior provision
for continuous on-site inspection of the principal Russian missile factory
would be eliminated. And our verification inspectors would only be permitted to
officially declared facilities — undeclared sites are available for treaty
substantial nuclear missile advantage over the United States exacerbated? Yes. The
treaty excludes tactical nuclear weapons where Russia has a more than five-to-one
advantage. But these weapons are a threat to our forces abroad, and to our
allies. Moreover, they could be re-deployed on Russia’s submarines to threaten us
■Under the treaty limits, is the United States the only country that
must reduce its launchers and strategic nuclear weapons? Yes. Russia has
negotiated the treaty limits to conform to the weapon levels it has already
planned. Thus, the United
States must make what are effectively
■Does the treaty provide gaping loopholes that Russia could
use to escape nuclear weapon limits entirely? Yes. For example, multiple
warhead missile bombers are counted under the treaty as only one warhead. While
we currently have more bombers than the Russians, they have embarked on new
programs for long-range bombers and for air-launched nuclear cruise missiles.
Thus, it is no surprise that Russia
is happy to undercount missiles on bombers.
■Does the treaty restrict not only our strategic nuclear program but
also our conventional weapons program? Yes. Any of our existing land-based or
submarine-based launchers that are fitted with conventional weapons would be
counted toward the treaty’s launchers limits.
■Does the treaty fail to limit Russia’s submarine-launched,
long-range cruise missiles? Yes. As former CIA Director R. James Woolsey
observes, given Russia’s planned deployment of a new 5,000 kilometer sub-launched cruise missile, “It is inexplicable that the administration would
seek no limitations over systems such as these.’’